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IF YOU ARE A GOOD CHRISTIAN YOU HAVE NO 
BUSINESS VOTING FOR THIS CANDIDATE: 
CHURCH SPONSORED POLITICAL ACTIVITY IN 
FEDERAL ELECTIONS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Politics and religion are two cornerstones of American culture.1 Politics 
is the mechanism by which the voting public makes decisions and 
influences policy; for the devout, religion is a way to make decisions and 
policy influencing private life.2 These worlds often overlap, as political 
candidates frequently stump at churches while on the campaign trail.3 It is 
perhaps inevitable that the two are often in conflict4 despite the fact that 
the Establishment Clause5 was created to erect Thomas Jefferson’s famous 
“wall of separation between church and State.”6 
 1. See generally A. JAMES REICHLEY, RELIGION IN AMERICAN PUBLIC LIFE (1985). 
 2. For an illustration of the difference between the two, see Robert N. Bellah, Civil Religion in 
America, in CHRISTIANITY AND MODERN POLITICS 34–35 (Louisa S. Hulett ed., 1993) (using John F. 
Kennedy’s 1960 inaugural address as an example). “[M]atters of his own private religious belief and 
of his relation to his own particular church . . . are not matters relevant in any direct way to the conduct 
of his public office.” Id. The roles of religion and politics have also been described as “first giving the 
individual an explanation of his relationship to the totality of existence and a means of transcending 
his apparently inexorable mortal fate, . . . [and] second providing techniques and institutions for 
managing the social units through which humans have always sought material security and emotional 
satisfaction.” REICHLEY, supra note 1, at 4. 
 3. See Onward G.O.P. Soldiers, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2004, at A22. 
 4. A September 2000 Pew Research Center study illustrates this unease. See Religion and 
Politics: The Ambivalent Majority, THE PEW RESEARCH CENTER FOR THE PEOPLE AND THE PRESS, 
Sept. 20, 2000, http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID=32. While seventy percent of 
those surveyed wanted a religious president, half also expressed unease at the prospect of politicians 
publicly discussing those views. Id. Fifty-one percent of registered voters surveyed were in favor of 
allowing religious organizations and churches to express their views on political issues, while forty-
five percent were against it. Id. However, sixty-four percent of registered voters surveyed believed it 
unacceptable for clergy to express political views from the pulpit. Id.  
 5. U.S. CONST., amend. I. For a discussion of the Establishment Clause as a structural restraint 
on government, not as a protector of individual religious rights, see Carl H. Esbeck, The Establishment 
Clause as a Structural Restraint on Government Power, 84 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1998). The author argues 
that viewing the Establishment Clause in this manner would prevent frequent clashes with the Free 
Exercise Clause. Id. at 12.  
 6. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1947) (citations omitted). Jefferson believed that 
there should be strict separation between religious belief, which should be protected by the 
government, and religious conduct, which should not. Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and 
Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, in CHRISTIANITY AND MODERN POLITICS, 
supra note 2, at 68 [hereinafter McConnell, Free Exercise of Religion]. Jefferson’s belief developed 
into the strict separationist theory of church-state relations. Michael W. McConnell, Why ‘Separation’ 
Is Not the Key to Church-State Relations, in CHRISTIANITY AND MODERN POLITICS, supra note 2, at 
183–84 [hereinafter McConnell, Why ‘Separation’ Is Not the Key]. Two other theories are the 
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This Note grapples with one of the federal government’s current means 
of ensuring church-state separation, and argues that it must develop a more 
consistent way to enforce the prohibition on political campaign activity by 
tax-exempt churches and religious organizations.7 Part II of this Note first 
explores the history of churches as tax-exempt organizations in the United 
States, then discusses enforcement issues and legislative reform proposals 
associated with the prohibition on political campaign activity.8 Part III of 
this Note will analyze and critique those enforcement procedures, 
questioning whether the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) effectively 
enforces the prohibition.9  
Part IV will propose that the Federal Election Commission (“FEC”) 
should have the power to work with the IRS to actively enforce the 
political campaign activity prohibition because it involves possible 
election influence.10 Part IV will further recommend that the IRS’ 
definition of “political activity” should be changed because of the 
negligible difference between allowable issue-related activities and 
prohibited express advocacy activities.11  
II. HISTORY 
“Faith, government and religious institutions are intertwined—the 
important thing is to figure out how the law should define their legal 
parameters.”12 One such legal parameter is found in the Internal Revenue 
neutrality principle and accommodationism. Id. Under the neutrality principle, government action 
should offer “neither incentive nor disincentive to practice a faith.” Id. at 186. Under 
accommodationist principles, governments should adjust facially neutral practices if the effect of those 
practices more severely burdens some beliefs or institutions than others. Id. at 187. Still other 
viewpoints include the social activist theory and the direct interventionist theory. See REICHLEY, supra 
note 2, at 3. Social activists believe in strict institutional separation of church and state, but also argue 
that churches and religious organizations should take an active political role in social justice issues. Id. 
At the other end of the spectrum, direct interventionists believe that the church and its leaders should 
play an active role in politics, with a relaxed view of separation between church and state. Id. 
(emphasis added). Lastly, subscribers to the equal separationist theory, similar to neutrality theorists, 
reject “all political or economic privilege, coercion, or disability based on religious affiliation, belief, 
or practice, or lack thereof,” but believe the state should guarantee “to religiously motivated or 
affiliated individuals and organizations the same rights and privileges extended to other similarly 
situated individuals and organizations.” Paul J. Weber, Neutrality and First Amendment Interpretation, 
in EQUAL SEPARATION: UNDERSTANDING THE RELIGION CLAUSES OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 5 (Paul 
J. Weber ed., 2003).  
 7. See infra Part IV. 
 8. See infra Part II.D. 
 9. See infra Part III.A. 
 10. See infra notes 145–148 and accompanying text. 
 11. See infra notes 157–165 and accompanying text. 
 12. JULIA K. STRONKS, LAW, RELIGION AND PUBLIC POLICY 36 (2002) (emphasis in original). 
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Code (the “Code”).13 Religious and charitable organizations are exempt 
from taxation under section 501(c)(3) of the Code.14 In exchange for this 
express statutory exclusion, organizations must refrain from participating 
or intervening in “any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) 
any candidate for public office.”15 Exempt organizations are also 
prohibited from lobbying or otherwise attempting to influence legislation 
as a substantial part of their activities.16 Churches can participate in 
nonpartisan efforts to educate voters, including voter registration drives 
and discussion of current social issues.17 Churches and other religious 
The Supreme Court has also acknowledged that “[n]o perfect or absolute separation is really possible; 
the very existence of the Religion Clauses is an involvement of sorts—one that seeks to mark 
boundaries to avoid excessive entanglement.” Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 670 (1970) 
(upholding property tax exemptions for churches and rejecting the argument that such exemptions are 
a violation of either the Establishment or Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment). 
 13. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000). 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. The IRS standard for what constitutes a violation of the prohibition on political activity is 
unclear. The Treasury Department’s Subcommittee on Political and Lobbying Activities & 
Organizations suggests the IRS will find a violation “if a reasonable person would conclude, in light of 
all relevant facts and circumstances, that the organization’s conduct must have had, as one of its 
purposes, to improve or diminish, directly or indirectly, the prospects for any individual or group of 
individuals to be elected to public office.” INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, DEP’T OF TREASURY, EO 
Committee of ABA Tax Section Offers Commentary on Politicking, 11 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 854, 
856 (1995) [hereinafter Commentary on Politicking]. For a list of activities cautioned against as 
potentially prohibited, see Deirdre Dessingue Halloran & Kevin M. Kearney, Federal Tax Code 
Restrictions on Church Political Activity, 38 CATH. LAW. 105, 110–11 (1998) (cautioning Catholic 
organizations against “indirectly supporting or opposing candidates,” including the “[u]se of plus or 
minus signs to signify whether a candidate agrees or disagrees with an organization’s position” on 
individual issues).  
 16. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000). The IRS measures lobbying activities using either the substantial 
part test or the expenditure test. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, PUBL’N NO. 
1828, Tax Guide for Churches and Religious Organizations 6, available at http://www.irs.gov (last 
visited Jan. 10, 2005) [hereinafter Tax Guide for Churches]. Because churches are not eligible for the 
expenditure test, the IRS uses the substantial part test to measure church lobbying activity. Id. This test 
is a fact sensitive inquiry, and factors taken into account include both the time and money spent on 
such activity. Id. On the other hand, a religious organization can elect to be evaluated under the 
expenditure test. Id.; see also I.R.C. § 501(h) (2000). The expenditure test is less subjective than the 
substantial part test. See Phil Harper & Larry Farmer, Election-Year Political Activity and the 
Separation of Church and State, CPA J. ONLINE, Aug. 2004, http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajournal/ 
2004/804/infocus/p20/htm. Under the expenditure test, the amount an organization is allowed to spend 
on lobbying activities depends on its size, with a fixed cap of $1,000,000. I.R.C. § 4911 (2000). 
Religious organizations, if they elect to use the expenditure test, can revoke this election and revert to 
the substantial part test at any time. Id.; see also Harper & Farmer, supra. However, what percentage 
of involvement in lobbying activities would constitute substantial participation is less clear. Id. The 
upper limit would most likely be fifteen percent of exempt purpose expenditures. Id. A more 
conservative estimate is five percent. Halloran & Kearney, supra note 15, at 108.  
 17. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, 2004 IRS ELECTION YEAR 
ADVISORY: CHARITIES MAY NOT ENGAGE IN POLITICAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES IR-2004-59, available 
at http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=122887,00.html (last visited May 15, 2006) [hereinafter 
2004 IRS ELECTION YEAR ADVISORY]. Nonpartisan efforts can neither be conducted in cooperation 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p1927 Shoop book pages.doc7/24/2006  
 
 
 
 
 
1930 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 83:1927 
 
 
 
 
 
 
organizations that violate these rules risk harsh penalties, including loss of 
tax-exempt status18 and a levy of excise tax on the amount of money spent 
on the prohibited political activity.19 Although an indirect penalty, 
churches also risk losing donations when they lose tax-exempt states 
because contributions are no longer deductible to the donor.20 
Non-profit corporations, including religious organizations, are 
organized under state law.21 A non-profit corporation may also be eligible 
for federal tax exemption if the IRS determines that it qualifies as a 
charitable organization under § 501(c)(3).22 To meet the § 501(c)(3) 
requirements, a church or other religious organization: (1) must be 
organized and operated exclusively for religious, educational, scientific, or 
other charitable purposes; (2) must not let net earnings inure to the benefit 
of a private individual or shareholder; (3) must not attempt to influence 
legislation as a substantial part of its activity; (4) must not intervene in 
with a campaign nor discuss a candidate’s identity. See Deirdre Dessingue, Prohibition in Search of a 
Rationale: What the Tax Code Prohibits; Why; To What End?, 42 B.C. L. REV. 903, 911–13 (2001). 
Furthermore, church efforts cannot focus on a specific political party or support a particular candidate 
(or party) because his or her views coincide with those of the church. Id. at 912. This is in keeping 
with the idea that voter education activities are traditionally nonpartisan, unlike political campaign 
activity. BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 509 (7th ed. 1998). 
However, at least one court has held that a mere claim of nonpartisanship does not automatically 
render an activity one of voter education rather than campaign activity. See Ass’n of the Bar of New 
York v. Comm’r, 858 F.2d 876, 880 (2d Cir. 1988) (“[T]he statute and pertinent regulations thereunder 
are not limited in their application to the partisan campaigns of candidates representing recognized 
political parties.”). See also Rev. Rul. 78-248, 1978-1 C.B. 154 (holding that widely distributed voter 
guides that publish candidates’ voting records on a narrow range of issues violate the campaign 
activity prohibition even if the guides are factual in nature and express no partisan opinions). But see 
Rev. Rul. 80-282, 1980-2 C.B. 178 (holding that a biased publication sent to a limited readership not 
in anticipation of a federal election does not violate the prohibition); Rev. Rul. 86-95, 1986-2 C.B. 73 
(holding that voter education forums that were unbiased and treated candidates equally does not 
violate the prohibition). For a more complete description of allowable and disallowed voter education 
activities, see Ann M. Murphy, Campaign Signs and the Collection Plate—Never the Twain Shall 
Meet?, 1 PITT. TAX. REV. 35, 38–39 (2003).  
 18. Tax Guide for Churches, supra note 16, at 5–6. 
 19. I.R.C. § 4955 (2000). Note that the imposition of an excise tax because of a § 501(c)(3) 
organization’s political expenditure does “not affect substantive standards for tax exemption.” Treas. 
Reg. § 53.4955-1(a) (2005). 
 20. See Tax Guide for Churches, supra note 16, at 3. While not a church, the NAACP, an 
established nonprofit organization, fears that loss of tax-exempt status would “devastate the group’s 
fund raising.” See Kelly Brewington, NAACP Refuses IRS Demand for Documents; Bond Calls 
Investigation Politically Motivated, BALT. SUN, Feb. 1, 2005, at 1A. 
 21. See, e.g., INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, FAQS ABOUT APPLYING 
FOR TAX EXEMPTION, http://www.irs.gov/charities/article/0,,id=96590,00.html (last visited Feb. 6, 
2005) [hereinafter TAX EXEMPTION FAQS]. Although non-profit corporations are creations of state 
law, this Note is concerned with prohibited political activity in federal elections only. Any legal issues 
regarding church involvement in state elections are beyond the scope of this Note. 
 22. IRC § 501(c)(3) (2000); see also, e.g., id.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss6/9
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political campaigns; and (5) must not have a purpose or conduct activities 
that are illegal or violate “fundamental public policy.”23 
Unlike other non-profit corporations, churches do not have to apply for 
federal tax-exempt status but are automatically considered such 
institutions.24 In contrast, religious organizations that are not churches 
must formally apply for tax-exempt status.25 Even though a church is 
automatically exempt, the IRS retains the power to revoke a church’s 
status if it violates any of the eligibility requirements.26 
A. Churches as Historically Tax-Exempt Institutions 
The federal government granted tax-exempt status to nonprofit 
organizations, including religious organizations, as far back as 1894.27 
After the passage of the Sixteenth Amendment in 1913,28 the government 
granted a special exemption to charitable organizations.29 In 1934, tax-
 23. IRC § 501(c)(3); see also Tax Guide for Churches, supra note 16, at 3. 
 24. Id. The term “church” is not specifically defined by either the Internal Revenue Code or 
Treasury Regulations. See IRC § 501(c)(3) (2000); 26 CFR 301.7611-1; Douglas H. Cook, The 
Politically Active Church, 35 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 457, 465 (2004). Instead, the IRS uses fourteen criteria 
to determine whether an organization is a church:  
(1) a distinct legal existence; (2) a recognized creed and form of worship; (3) a definite and 
distinct ecclesiastical government; (4) a formal code of doctrine and discipline; (5) a distinct 
religious history; (6) a membership not associated with any other church or denomination; (7) 
an organization of ordained ministers; (8) ordained ministers selected after completing 
prescribed studies; (9) a literature of its own; (10) established places of worship; (11) regular 
congregations; (12) regular religious services; (13) Sunday schools for religious instruction of 
the young; and (14) schools for the preparation of its ministers.  
See Spiritual Outreach Soc’y v. Comm’r, 927 F.2d 335, 338 (8th Cir. 1991) (citing a speech given by 
former IRS Commissioner Jerome Kurtz). While a helpful guide, not all fourteen criteria are required. 
Id. However, special emphasis is placed on organized ministry, regular religious services, religious 
education, and dissemination of a doctrinal code. Id. at 339 (citing Lutheran Soc. Servs. v. United 
States, 758 F.2d 1283, 1287 (8th Cir. 1985)). According to the IRS, many churches apply for tax-
exempt status even though they are not required to do so, in part to assure donors that their 
contributions are tax deductible. See Tax Guide for Churches, supra note 16, at 3.  
 25. Tax Guide for Churches, supra note 16, at 3. Note that religious organizations whose annual 
gross receipts do not exceed $5,000 do not have to apply for tax-exempt status. Id.  
 26. IRC § 7611(d)(1) (2000). 
 27. HOPKINS, supra note 17, at 32. The 1894 Revenue Act, while later declared unconstitutional, 
was the first “comprehensive federal income tax law” and included exemptions for religious, 
educational, and charitable corporations. PAUL J. WEBER & DENNIS A. GILBERT, PRIVATE CHURCHES 
AND PUBLIC MONEY: CHURCH-GOVERNMENT FISCAL RELATIONS 31 (1981). The development of tax 
exemption for religious organizations can be traced as far back as the English Statute of Charitable 
Uses of 1601. Id. at 29. During American colonial times it was the norm to grant complete exemption 
to religious, educational, and other charitable institutions. Id. at 30. In post-Revolutionary War times, 
these organizations continued to be exempt from tax under state law and local ordinance, prior to the 
implementation of the federal income tax. Id. 
 28. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. 
 29. See HOPKINS, supra note 17, at 12–14. The original regulations defined charitable activities 
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exempt organizations became legally prohibited from spending substantial 
time and resources on lobbying activities.30 In 1954, then-Senator Lyndon 
B. Johnson introduced the prohibition on political campaign activity as an 
amendment to the Code.31 The amendment was passed without any 
changes or debate.32 This prohibition banned any involvement in political 
campaigns by any organization established under section 501(c)(3), 
including churches and religious organizations.33 The prohibition involves 
four elements that all must be fulfilled to constitute a violation of the ban: 
(1) participation or intervention in a political campaign; (2) political 
activity that involves a specific political campaign; (3) such campaign 
involves a specific individual; and (4) such individual must be a candidate 
for public office.34 
as, among others, those activities giving “relief to the poor . . . and lessening of the burdens of 
government.” Id. at 12. 
 30. See generally Revenue Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-216, 48 Stat. 680 (1934). See also Wyatt 
McDowell, How Religious Organizations and Churches Can Be Politically Correct, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 
71, 75 (2003) (describing this first formal limit on political activity as a prohibition against substantial 
lobbying activity or “carrying on propaganda.”); Oliver A. Houck, On the Limits of Charity: Lobbying, 
Litigation, and Electoral Politics by Charitable Organizations Under the Internal Revenue Code and 
Related Laws, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 21–24 (2003) (describing the legislative history of the lobbying 
prohibition, noting that, at that time, Congress specifically decided that a prohibition on charities’ 
participation in electoral campaigns would be too broad a restriction). 
 31. See Dessingue, supra note 17, at 905–06 (citations omitted). 
 32. See Patrick L. O’Daniel, More Honored in the Breach: A Historical Perspective of the 
Permeable IRS Prohibition on Campaigning by Churches, 42 B.C. L. REV. 733, 740 (2001). The 
author posits that there is no evidence that church-state separation concerns had anything to do with 
Johnson’s proposed ban on political activity. Id. at 768. Instead it well might have been retaliation 
against conservative, tax-exempt organizations in Texas that were opposed to the Senator’s candidacy 
prior to his election. Id. at 767–68. Note that the prohibition applies to organizations only and does not 
operate to restrict political activities of pastors or church members in their individual capacity. 
Dessingue, supra note 17, at 914. For an additional description of the context in which the political 
campaign activity prohibition was passed, see Houck, supra note 30, at 23–29. But see Murphy, supra 
note 17, at 54 (suggesting that McCarthyism, rather than Johnson’s personal political issues, was the 
real impetus for the passage of the prohibition of political activity). 
 33. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000); see also McDowell, supra note 30, at 75 (theorizing that the 
prohibition was passed to “emphasize government neutrality while restating the objective that 
charitable and religious activity must be exclusively dedicated to their stated tax-exempt purpose”). A 
church or religious organization choosing not to organize under § 501(c)(3) is free to engage in 
unlimited lobbying efforts and campaign activity. See also infra note 59 for an in-depth discussion of 
the advantages and disadvantages of tax-exemption. Protection of non-§ 501(c)(3) organizations under 
the Free Exercise Clause is presumed valid and beyond the scope of this Note. 
 34. See McDowell, supra note 30, at 80. Participation or intervention includes “[p]ublication or 
distribution of printed or oral statements in support of or opposition to candidates.” Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(iii) (2005). These restrictions apply to all § 501(c)(3) organizations, not just 
churches and religious organizations. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000). Steffen Johnson argues that the 
government’s interest in prohibiting political activity of churches and religious organizations is only 
valid to the extent it applies to all tax-exempt entities. Steffen Johnson, Of Politics and Pulpits: A First 
Amendment Analysis of IRS Restrictions on the Political Activities of Religious Organizations, 42 B.C. 
L. REV. 875, 893–94 (2001).  
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B. The IRS Giveth, the IRS Taketh Away 
Christian Echoes National Ministry, Inc. v. United States35 was a 
prominent, early case in which the IRS revoked a religious organization’s 
tax-exempt status.36 The IRS granted § 501(C)(3) tax-exempt status to 
Christian Echoes, an Oklahoma-based religious organization, in 1953,37 
but revoked it in 1964 because Christian Echoes attempted to influence the 
passage of legislation proposing restoration of prayer in public schools.38 
Christian Echoes paid the taxes assessed under protest and subsequently 
filed a refund suit against the IRS, claiming tax-exempt status.39 
The court’s opinion addressed whether the “limitation on attempts to 
influence legislation”40 should be construed broadly or narrowly.41 The 
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals chose to construe the limitation broadly, 
noting that many of Christian Echoes’ publications urged the public to act 
on certain political issues.42 It went on to hold that merely failing to name 
a specific piece of legislation does not necessarily mean that an 
organization has not, in fact, attempted to influence a specific piece of 
legislation under the guise of affecting public opinion on a nonpartisan 
social issue.43 The fact that Christian Echoes tried to shape public opinion 
as part of an “indirect campaign” to influence legislation was enough to 
violate the limitation.44 Although Christian Echoes did not specifically 
endorse political candidates, it frequently attacked candidates who had 
opposite political leanings.45 
Christian Echoes argued in the alternative that the denial of tax-exempt 
status was unconstitutional because it violated the Free Exercise Clause.46 
The court rejected this argument, holding that: 
 35. 470 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1972). 
 36. See Houck, supra note 30, at 858. 
 37. Id. at 852. 
 38. Id. at 852–53. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 854. 
 41. Id. The lower court construed the limitation narrowly. Id. 
 42. Id. at 855. The Christian Echoes organization encouraged its readers to act by contacting 
members of Congress for the purpose of influencing their political decisions, getting involved in local 
politics, supporting the amendment restoring prayer in schools, withdrawing from the United Nations, 
and retaining the House Committee on UnAmerican Activities, among other things. Id. at 855.  
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Christian Echoes Nat’l Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849, 856 (10th Cir. 1972). 
 46. Id. The court went on to say that society must be protected against “political partisanship by 
Government employees.” Id. at 857. 
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The free exercise clause of the First Amendment is restrained only 
to the extent of denying tax-exempt status and then only in keeping 
with an overwhelming and compelling Governmental interest: That 
of guarantying that the wall separating church and state remain high 
and firm.47 
The court upheld the revocation of Christian Echoes’ tax-exempt 
status, stating that, as a matter of principle, the government cannot directly 
or indirectly subsidize organizations who are substantially involved in 
political activity.48 
The next major case involving revocation of a church’s tax-exempt 
status was over twenty years later, in Branch Ministries v. Rossotti.49 
Branch Ministries ran a full page ad in two national newspapers four days 
prior to the 1992 presidential election which openly criticized candidate 
Bill Clinton.50 The ad also stated that the church would gladly accept tax-
deductible donations to defray the cost of running the ad.51 Shortly 
thereafter, the IRS began a church tax inquiry into possible political 
expenditures by Branch Ministries.52 A church tax inquiry is a special 
audit process for churches that the IRS can only begin if “a high-level 
Treasury official reasonably believes . . . that the church—(A) may not be 
exempt, by reason of its status as a church, from tax under section 501(a), 
or (B) may be carrying on activities subject to taxation, carrying on an 
unrelated trade or business . . . or otherwise engaged in activities subject to 
taxation under this title.”53 The church claimed that the ad was not political 
activity, but merely a warning to Christians concerning issues of the day.54 
The IRS, however, revoked the church’s tax-exempt status, and the church 
in turn sued the government, alleging violations of the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act, the First Amendment, and selective prosecution in 
violation of the church’s Fifth Amendment equal protection rights.55  
 47. Id.  
 48. Id.  
 49. 211 F.3d 137 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
 50. Id. at 140. The ad’s headline was “Christians Beware” and stated that Clinton’s support of 
abortion rights and homosexuality “violated Biblical precepts.” Id.  
 51. Id. 
 52. Id.  
 53. I.R.C. § 7611(a)(2) (2006). The facts and circumstances giving rise to that reasonable belief 
must be recorded in writing. Id. If the inquiry does not result in revocation of status, notice of 
deficiency of assessment, or a request that the church significantly change its operations, the IRS is 
barred from beginning another inquiry of that church for five years. See Tax Guide for Churches, 
supra note 17, at 22. 
 54. Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 40 F. Supp. 2d 15, 18 (D.D.C. 1999). 
 55. Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137, 139–41 (D.C. Cir. 2000). U.S. CONST. amend. I, 
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The IRS contended that although the church was a bona fide church,56 
it was not exempt under “[s]ection 501(c)(3) because it had published or 
distributed a statement in opposition to a candidate for public office.”57 
The Court dismissed the church’s argument that the IRS had no statutory 
authority to revoke its tax-exempt status,58 and rejected the church’s claim 
that revocation of its tax-exempt status substantially burdened its free 
exercise of religion.59 
C. Constitutional Limits on Congressional Power over Church Activities 
1. The Free Exercise Clause 
Congress is forbidden from passing any law that interferes with the free 
exercise of religion.60 According to the Branch Ministries court, the IRS’s 
ability to grant or deny statutory tax-exempt status to churches is not a 
violation of the Free Exercise Clause.61 The purpose of the Free Exercise 
Clause is only “to prevent the government from singling out religious 
V; Religious Freedom Restoration Act, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993). The Act in 
addition to restoring the compelling interest test for Free Exercise clause claims, also provided a cause 
of action to “persons whose religious exercise is substantially burdened by government.” Id. § 2(5). 
The Act was later held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 
(1997). The church may have had a stronger argument for selective prosecution than the court 
acknowledged. See id. at 144–45. In 1994, the IRS declined to investigate a Harlem church that 
reportedly expressed open support for Governor Cuomo during his re-election campaign. See Harper 
& Farmer, supra note 16. Rev. O’Neill Mackey of the Bethel African Methodist Episcopal Church in 
Harlem openly endorsed Governor Cuomo from the pulpit, saying “Mario Cuomo is our man.” 
Nicholas Goldberg, Will Blacks Turn Out for Cuomo?, NEWSDAY, Oct. 2, 1994, at A4. 
 56. The church tried to factually distinguish itself from the facts in Christian Echoes arguing that 
Christian Echoes was a religious radio network while the church in Branch Ministries was a church 
qua church, the church further argued that the IRS had “‘never revoked the tax exempt status of a 
church qua church before.’” See Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 40 F. Supp. 2d 15, 20 (D.D.C. 1999) 
(internal citation omitted).  
 57. Id. at 21. 
 58. Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137, 141–42 (D.C. Cir. 2000). The IRS conditions 
tax-exempt status for religious organization within the meaning of § 501(c)(3) on “non-intervention in 
political campaigns.” Id.  
 59. Id. at 142. “The sole effect of the loss of the tax exemption will be to decrease the amount of 
money available to the Church for its religious practices. [S]uch a burden ‘is not constitutionally 
significant.’” Id. (internal citations omitted). The court noted that as long as the church refrained from 
future political intervention, it could again hold itself out as tax-exempt and receive all benefits, or it 
could “form a related organization” that could legally engage in political activities. Id. at 142–43. The 
only substantial difference is that contributions to the related organization would not be tax deductible. 
Id. at 143. While donors may be less likely to contribute if their gifts are not deductible, this burden 
alone is not constitutionally significant. Id. at 142. 
 60. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 61. Branch Ministries, 211 F.3d at 137. 
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practice for peculiar disability.”62 Under a neutrality view of church-state 
relations trial require government actions to neither encourage nor 
discourage religious practices, as long as the political activity restrictions 
treat comparable nonreligious institutions in the same manner, there is no 
Free Exercise Clause violation.63 An analysis under the accommodationist 
view, which prohibits application of even a facially neutral government 
practice if it unfairly burdens religion, would produce the opposite result 
because the political activity prohibition does have the effect of restricting 
certain types of speech.64 Regardless of which theory one favors, at least 
one author has criticized the Branch Ministries decision because it did not 
firmly establish a line between politics and religion.65 
2. The Establishment Clause 
Neither Christian Echoes nor Branch Ministries reached the possible 
Establishment Clause issue.66 The Establishment Clause “is designed to 
prohibit the government from establishing a religion, or aiding a religion, 
or preferring one religion over another.”67 Professor Oliver Houck raises 
the question of whether the political activity restrictions may be required 
by the concept of separation of church and state itself.68 The answer to this 
question depends on whether one adopts a neutrality, separationist, or 
accommodationist theory of church-state relations.69 Like the neutrality 
 62. McConnell, Free Exercise of Religion, supra note 6, at 53. 
 63. See McConnell, Why ‘Separation’ Is Not the Key, supra note 6, at 186. 
 64. Id. at 187. 
 65. See Joan Elizabeth Clarke et al., Recent Decisions of the United States Courts of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia Circuit: Constitutional Law, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 554, 564 (2001).  
[T]he D.C. Circuit . . . did not provide guidance on where to draw the line between politics 
and faith, and thus left unanswered the question What exactly constitutes religious conduct? 
Without insight into its rationale, the D.C. Circuit characterized the Church’s conduct as 
engaging in electoral politics, as opposed to conduct mandated by religious belief. This 
seemingly arbitrary distinction ignores the fact that politics and faith are easily intertwined. 
Religious tenets may actually mandate that adherents participate in politics outside of the 
church.  
Id.  
 66. See generally Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Christian Echoes 
Nat’l Ministry v. United States, 470 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1972). For a discussion of the development of 
Establishment Clause doctrine, see Houck, supra note 30, at 52–62 (arguing that the Founders’ intent, 
to prevent the establishment of religion has been undercut by permissive jurisprudence and the current 
favorable political climate).  
 67. HOPKINS, supra note 17, at 193. 
 68. See Houck, supra note 30, at 52. 
 69. Id. at 53.  
As the dust settles, we have a line of cases permitting federal subsidies for religious activities 
on the basis of neutrality. On the other hand, another line keeps churches out of government 
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theorists described earlier in this section but unlike the 
accommodationists, separationists believe that religious organizations and 
churches should be treated the same as all other nonprofit institutions.70 
Professor Houck suggests that if “the potentially powerful influence of 
religious organizations on politics is perceived as an establishment threat 
to a secular democracy, then [secular charities] may be separated from the 
Christian Echoes National Ministry, and have [their leashes] removed.”71 
The Supreme Court has adopted the neutrality approach to church-state 
relations.72 This approach seems to be partially based on the rationale that 
tax exemption for religious and charitable organizations (including 
churches) is the effect of the federal government’s decision to subsidize 
these organizations.73 Neutrality is perhaps the only approach that the 
Court can feasibly adopt, in light of the fact that it would be 
unconstitutional under both the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses 
for the government to formulate a common law or statutory definition of 
“religion” and apply it to religious organizations.74 
decision making, for the very danger they pose to the American political system. Where 
between these two poles federal subsidies to religious institutions for political activity falls 
will depend in large part on how seriously one perceives the danger of that activity to be. 
Which, in turn, may depend on one’s own religious beliefs—the difficulty in a nutshell.  
Id. at 61–62; see also CHRISTIANITY AND MODERN POLITICS, supra note 2, at 183–88 (citing MICHAEL 
W. MCCONNELL, WHY ‘SEPARATION’ IS NOT THE KEY TO CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS). Professor 
Garnett, on the other hand, argues that religious communities who take an active role in politics do not 
pose a danger to the government; in fact, he argues that such communities “are crucial sources for the 
kind of counter-speech that liberal governments should expect and free societies require.” Richard W. 
Garnett, A Quiet Faith? Taxes, Politics, and the Privatization of Religion, 42 B.C. L. REV. 771, 800–
01 (2001). Professor Garnett also argues that federal tax exemption of churches and religious 
organizations may be seen as an attempt by the government to gain ultimate power over religion; that 
is, the power to destroy. Id. at 772.  
 70. See supra note 6. 
 71. Houck, supra note 30, at 88. 
 72. See HOPKINS, supra note 17, at 193. See also Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 669–70 
(1970) (upholding tax exemption of religious properties). The government must avoid excessive 
entanglement and adhere to the “policy of neutrality . . . that has prevented the kind of involvement 
that would tip the balance toward government control of churches or governmental restraint on 
religious practice.” Id.  
 73. Under the subsidy theory, the federal government grants tax exemption to those organizations 
that perform a role the government would otherwise need to perform. Murphy, supra note 17, at 63. 
The Supreme Court has held that both tax-exempt status and tax deductible contributions are forms of 
government subsidy. Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 544 (1983). The Court 
likened the effect of tax exemption to a cash grant by the federal government. Id. For a discussion of 
other theories explaining the tax exemption of churches and religious organizations see Erika King, 
Tax Exemptions and the Establishment Clause, 49 SYRACUSE L. REV. 971, 981–87 (1999) (suggesting, 
as one rationale, that tax exemption is sensible because the government lacks an efficient means to 
track and tax these organizations). 
 74. HOPKINS, supra note 17, at 194. As is the case with the term “church,” there is no statutory 
or regulatory definition of the words “religion” or “religious” by the federal government. Id.; I.R.C. 
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D. Church Activity in Recent Federal Campaigns 
In April 2004, the IRS issued an election-year advisory to charitable 
organizations as it had done for the three previous presidential elections.75 
The letter warns, in part: 
These organizations cannot endorse any candidates, make donations 
to their campaigns, engage in fund raising, distribute statements, or 
become involved in any other activities that may be beneficial or 
detrimental to any candidate. Even activities that encourage people 
to vote for or against a particular candidate on the basis of 
nonpartisan criteria violate the political campaign prohibition of 
section 501(c)(3).76 
There is no bright line standard for determining whether an 
organization has engaged in prohibited activity; instead, the individual 
facts and circumstances of each case are considered.77 
Despite the IRS’ warning, the 2004 presidential election appears to 
have wrought more apparent § 501(C)(3) violations than in previous 
years.78 President Bush’s re-election campaign actively sought to mobilize 
the political power of conservative Christians.79 On the other hand, inner-
city churches and churches with largely minority congregations openly 
supported John Kerry from the pulpit.80 
§ 501(C)(3) (2000) (lacking a definition of religion).  
 75. 2004 IRS Election Year Advisory, supra note 17.  
 76. Id. 
 77. Id.  
 78. See Jones, infra note 89. 
 79. See David D. Kirkpatrick, Bush Allies Till Fertile Soil, Among Baptists, for Votes, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 18, 2004, at A25. The Bush campaign paid for a “pastors reception” and collected 
signatures from ministers who promised to publicly endorse Bush’s re-election. Id. The Bush 
campaign’s goal was to mobilize the estimated four million conservative Christians who did not vote 
in the 2000 election. Id. 
 80. See Robert D. McFadden, On the Final Sunday, Sermons Pulse With the Power of Spiritual 
Suggestion, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2004, at A22. Under the guise of merely “sharing the facts,” the 
Bishop of the Baptist Worship Center in Philadelphia proclaimed that President Bush had “misled and 
mismanaged” the country, and that John Kerry had a plan for the future. Id. Such issues are nothing 
new. Even as the Clinton Administration in the late 1990s sought to encourage greater clarity and 
separation of church and state, President Clinton himself spoke during a worship service at New 
Psalmist Baptist Church in Baltimore—a service that was broadcast on live television just prior to the 
1998 midterm congressional elections. See Randy Lee, When a King Speaks of God; When God Speaks 
to a King: Faith, Politics, Tax Exempt Status, and the Constitution in the Clinton Administration, 63 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 391, 391–95 (2000). Professor Lee draws parallels to the actions of New 
Psalmist Baptist Church and Branch Ministries, since Branch Ministries lost its tax-exempt status 
while the IRS did not even investigate New Psalmist:  
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Apart from simply mobilizing voters, however, some church officials 
skated even closer to the edge of prohibited political activity.81 Several 
watchdog groups, believing that churches have indeed crossed the line, 
have asked the IRS to investigate alleged violations.82 For example, 
Archbishop Raymond Burke of St. Louis publicly stated in 2004 that he 
“would not give communion to [John] Kerry because of the senator’s 
abortion-rights views.”83 On October 1, 2004, Archbishop Burke 
published a Pastoral Letter entitled “On Our Civic Responsibility for the 
Common Good.”84 In it, he characterized gay marriage, stem cell research, 
euthanasia, and abortion as intrinsically evil.85 He further maintained that 
war and capital punishment, while also against church teaching and, 
therefore, rarely justifiable, may be justified in some circumstances and 
are, consequently, not equally troubling.86 He then stated that there is no 
justification for “voting for a candidate who . . . endorses and supports the 
deliberate killing of the innocent, abortion, embryonic stem-cell research, 
euthanasia. . .,” or same-sex marriage.87 In response to these statements by 
Archbishop Burke, Catholics for a Free Choice filed an IRS complaint 
against the Archdiocese of St. Louis.88 The complaint alleged that the 
First, both churches issued a message that a text sacred to their faith favored or disfavored the 
policies of a particular candidate or party in an upcoming election. Second, both churches 
indicated to their believers that this relation between policies and sacred text required the 
believers to act with their vote in a particular manner. Third, both churches sent these 
messages at the height of the campaign season, only days before the election. . . . 
Id. at 397.  
 81. For example, Cardinal Justin Rigali of Philadelphia has gone so far to state that the concept 
of church-state separation is in itself “‘a misinterpretation of the Constitution.’” David D. Kirkpatrick, 
Battle Cry of Faithful Pits Believers Against Unbelievers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2004, § 1, at 24.  
 82. Americans United for Separation of Church and State (“Americans United”) is one such 
organization. It describes itself as a “religious liberty watchdog group” whose mission is to “educate[] 
Americans about the importance of church-state separation in safeguarding religious freedom.” 
Americans United: Our Issues, http://www.au.org/site/PageServer?pagename=issues (last visited Apr. 
5, 2006). The group advocates absolute neutrality on the part of the government in all religious issues. 
Id. 
 83. See Julie Poppen & Todd Hartman, Directive Divides Faithful; Communion Letter Stirs 
Debate Among Catholic Electorate, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS (Denver), May 15, 2004, at 3A. Closer 
to the election, Archbishop Burke also declared, along with Archbishops John J. Myers of Newark and 
Michael J. Sheridan of Colorado Springs, “that the obligation to oppose abortion outweigh[ed] any 
other issue.” David D. Kirkpatrick & Laurie Goodstein, Group of Bishops Using Influence to Oppose 
Kerry, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2004, at A23.  
 84. Pastoral Letter from Raymond L. Burke, Archbishop of St. Louis, On Our Civic 
Responsibility for the Common Good, available at http://www.archstl.org/commoffice/2004/letters/10-
01-04-civic_responsibility.pdf (last visited May 15, 2006) [hereinafter “Burke Letter”]. 
 85. Id. ¶¶ 23–25, 28. 
 86. Id. ¶ 30. 
 87. Id. ¶ 39. 
 88. See Press Release, Catholics for a Free Choice, Catholics for a Free Choice Files IRS 
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Pastoral Letter offers specific instructions on how to vote, which violated 
the prohibition on political campaign activity.89  
Such a voting mandate highlights the problem of separating issue 
advocacy from express advocacy of specific candidates, which Congress 
addressed in the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (“BCRA”) of 2002.90 
BCRA abolished the election law distinction between issue advocacy and 
express advocacy in favor of a new category of “electioneering 
communications.”91 Under this definition, a campaign ad does not have to 
use a candidate’s name in order to qualify as a regulated electioneering 
Complaint Against Archdiocese of St. Louis (Oct. 26, 2004) (statement of Frances Kissling, President, 
Catholics for a Free Choice), available at http://www.catholicsforchoice.org/news/pr/2004/2004102 
birscomplaintStlouis.asp (last visited May 15, 2006).  
 89. Id. Catholics for a Free Choice has filed complaints with the IRS about the political activities 
of several other religious organizations in recent months, including the Archdiocese of Denver, Priests 
for Life, the Culture of Life Foundation, and Catholic Answers “for their flagrant violations of their 
tax-exempt status.” Id.; see also infra note 115 (describing the organization and its mission). In a press 
release announcing the Denver Complaint, Catholics for a Free Choice alleges that the Archdiocese 
provided “clear guidance” to voters on acceptable candidates. Press Release, Catholics for a Free 
Choice, Catholics for a Free Choice Files IRS Complaint Against Denver Archdiocese (Oct. 25, 2004), 
available at http://www.catholicsforchoice.org/news/pr/2004/20041025irscomplaintdenver.asp (last 
visited May 15, 2006).  
 This Note will concentrate on the Archdiocese of St. Louis as a representative example of a larger 
issue. However, the St. Louis Archdiocese is far from the only alleged offender of the prohibition on 
political activity, and Catholics for a Free Choice is not the only group filing complaints with the IRS. 
See Tim Jones, Pulpits rev up in campaign; Ohio churches’ activity prompts complaints to IRS, CHI. 
TRIB., Apr. 30, 2006, at C3 (“[N]early three-quarters of 82 investigations by the IRS of church and 
charitable activity in 2004 uncovered prohibited political activity. . . .”). In July 2004, the Campaign 
Legal Center “sent a letter to the Commissioner of the IRS and filed a complaint with the Federal 
Election Commission” alleging that Jerry Falwell Ministries, Inc., a § 501(c)(3) organization, openly 
endorsed George W. Bush for re-election on its website and asked for contributions to a federal 
political action committee, Campaign for Working Families. Press Release, Campaign Legal Center, 
Legal Center Files Complaints Against Falwell Ministries (July 27, 2004), available at 
http://www.campaignlegalcenter.org/IRS-154.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2006). As of this writing, there 
is nothing to indicate that Falwell Ministries is in danger of losing its tax-exempt status. See also infra 
note 111 and accompanying text. It should be noted however, that the Falwell Ministries’ website is 
sponsored by the Liberty Alliance, a 501(c)(4) not-for-profit. See www.falwell.com. 501(c)(4) 
corporations are allowed to lobby and influence legislation. IRC § 501(c)(4). 
 90. Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002). BCRA abolished the express advocacy magic 
words standard for defining types of campaign communications arising from the landmark Supreme 
Court decision in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). See Dennis F. Thompson, Law and Democracy: 
A Symposium on the Law Governing the Democratic Process: Two Concepts of Corruption: Making 
Campaigns Safe for Democracy, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1036, 1060–61 (2005). Buckley upheld the 
Federal Election Campaign Act’s power to regulate “expenditures for communications that in express 
terms advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate for federal office.” Id. at 44. 
Such express terms include “‘vote for,’ ‘elect,’ ‘support,’ ‘cast your ballot for,’ ‘Smith for Congress,’ 
‘vote against,’ ‘defeat’ or ‘reject.’” Id. at 44 n.52. BCRA instead defined a new term, of 
“electioneering communications.” Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 
§ 201(a)(3), 116 Stat. 88–89 (2002); see also infra note 92.  
 91. See generally Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002). See Richard Briffault, McConnell v. 
FEC and the Transformation of Campaign Finance Law, 3 ELECTION L.J. 147, 155–56 (2004). 
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communication.92 In an article preceding the passage of BCRA, Steffen 
Johnson suggests that it is next to impossible to truly separate issue 
advocacy from candidate advocacy: “Compounding the difficulty of 
separating advocacy concerning political issues from advocacy concerning 
candidates is the fact that candidates come to be known for their ideals and 
policy stands. Indeed, policy stances are sometimes identified so closely 
with particular politicians that the stances take on the name of the 
politician.”93 
Believing that issue advocacy is not only separate from candidate 
advocacy but a constitutionally protected right, the plaintiffs in McConnell 
v. Federal Election Commission94 challenged the adoption of the 
electioneering communications standard.95 They argued that case 
precedent “drew a constitutionally mandated line between express 
advocacy and . . . issue advocacy” because viewpoint speech is protected 
 92. Electioneering communications are defined as “any broadcast, cable, or satellite 
communication which . . . refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office . . . [and] is made 
within . . . 60 days . . . [of that candidate’s general election] or . . . 30 days before [that candidate’s] 
primary . . . election. . . .” Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 201(a)(3)(A), 116 
Stat. 81 (2002). In certain circumstances, a communication is an electioneering communication if it 
attacks or supports a candidate, regardless of whether it expressly names or advocates for or against a 
candidate, if it is so suggestive that there is no other plausible conclusion other than that the 
communication targets a specific candidate. Id. § 201(a)(3)(A)(ii). The IRS, despite the urging of 
Treasury lawyers in 1994 and earlier, declined to adopt Buckley’s now-defunct express advocacy 
standard to determine whether or not an action by a § 501(c)(3) organization violated the prohibition 
on political campaign activity. See Commentary on Politicking, supra note 15, at 856. 
 93. See Johnson, supra note 34, at 883. Johnson further argues that there are “times when there is 
no effective way for religious bodies to speak about political issues they care about without expressing 
support for, or opposition to, the candidates who embody positions on those issues.” Id. For example, 
in a race between an openly pro-life candidate and an openly pro-choice candidate, any election 
communication dealing with abortion would invariably endorse or disclaim a particular candidate. See 
Fed. Election Comm’n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238, 249 (1986). In this case the 
court held that a nonprofit organization’s election publication asking voters to vote pro-life 
accompanied by photographs of thirteen favorable candidates with their voting records on the issue 
provided an “explicit directive” to vote for a particular candidate. Id. at 241–44, 249. “The fact that 
this message is marginally less direct than ‘Vote for Smith’ does not change its essential nature.” Id. at 
249. Johnson contends that political activity restrictions on churches “amounts to content-based 
discrimination[] because it targets a narrow subset of core political speech. . .” with the effect of 
insulating “public figures from criticism.” Johnson, supra note 34, at 887–88. He goes on to argue that 
such restrictions, like other financially burdensome restrictions, should be subject to strict 
constitutional scrutiny. Id. at 889. 
 94. 540 U.S. 93 (2003). McConnell, filed on the day the bill was passed, challenged the 
constitutionality of a number of BCRA’s provisions. For a brief description on the background of the 
lawsuit, see The Campaign Finance Guide: A History of Money and Politics, THE CAMPAIGN LEGAL 
CENTER, http://www.campaignfinanceguide.org/guide-36.html (last visited May 15, 2006). The 
Federal Election Commission (“FEC”) is the enforcement agency for federal election law. About the 
FEC, http://www.fec.gov/about.shtml (last visited Apr. 7, 2006). 
 95. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 190.  
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by the First Amendment, and thus, cannot be regulated.96 The Court 
rejected this argument, holding that the express advocacy restriction 
previously developed in Buckley v. Valeo97 was a restriction based on 
statutory, not constitutional, construction.98 The First Amendment does not 
create “a rigid barrier between express advocacy and so-called issue 
advocacy.”99 In effect, BCRA eliminated important loopholes in existing 
campaign finance regulation.100 
Congress in recent years has made several attempts to relax the 
prohibition on political campaign activity for churches. In 2001, Rep. 
Walter Jones of North Carolina proposed the Houses of Worship Political 
Speech Protection Act.101 This Act would have removed churches, but not 
other tax-exempt organizations, from the absolute prohibition on political 
activity.102 Under the proposed legislation, churches would be able to 
participate in candidate-specific campaign activity in a limited manner, as 
long as it was not a substantial part of their activities.103 The bill was 
defeated in the House of Representatives by a wide margin in late 2002.104 
The bill was redrafted and introduced as the Houses of Worship Free 
Speech Restoration Act in 2003.105 In a modification from the previous 
proposal, the legislation would allow churches to conduct campaign-
related political activity as long as it occurred in the “content, preparation, 
or presentation of any homily, sermon, teaching, dialectic, or other 
presentation made during religious services or gatherings.”106 Having 
 96. Id.  
 97. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
 98. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 190–92. 
 99. Id. “[T]he unmistakable lesson from the record in this litigation . . . is that Buckley’s magic-
words requirement is functionally meaningless.” Id. at 193. The Court further notes that the express 
advocacy standard “has not aided the legislative effort to combat real or apparent corruption. . . .” Id. 
at 194. For an more in-depth analysis of McConnell’s holdings and the implications for future 
campaign finance reform and regulation, see Briffault, supra note 92. The author writes that the 
McConnell decision “indicated that Congress should play a leading role in balancing the multiple 
competing political and constitutional concerns implicated by a campaign finance regulation.” Id. at 
149.  
 100. See Richard Briffault, The Future of Reform: Campaign Finance After the Bipartisan 
Campaign Reform Act of 2002, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1179, 1181 (2002).  
 101. H.R. 2357, 107th Cong. § 1 (2001). 
 102. Id.; Cook, supra note 24, at 467.  
 103. Id. at 467–68. The substantiality standard described for the purpose of this legislation is the 
same one currently used to measure acceptable lobbying activities of § 501(c)(3) organizations. Id. at 
468. 
 104. Id.  
 105. H.R. 235, 108th Cong. § 1 (2003). 
 106. Id. This legislation would allow ministers or other religious leaders to endorse or attack a 
specific candidate for office as long as the statement was made from the pulpit without endangering 
tax-exempt status. H.R. 2357, 107th Cong. § 1 (2002). See also Murphy, supra note 17, at 65–66. 
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failed to come to a vote last term, Rep. Jones re-introduced the bill in 
January 2005.107  
A second legislative proposal on this subject occurred in the last 
Congressional session, via proposed amendment to the American Jobs 
Creation Act of 2004.108 The amendment would have allowed churches 
three unintentional violations of the political activity prohibition before 
risking tax-exempt status.109 The amendment was removed during a 
committee meeting before the final bill came to a vote.110 
Professor Murphy argues that allowing churches to engage in this behavior is more problematic than 
allowing similar rights to other 501(c)(3) organizations. Murphy, supra note 17, at 75–76. A church 
can hold itself out as a tax-exempt organization without first applying to the IRS. I.R.C. 
§ 508(C)(1)(A) (2000); see also Murphy, supra note 17, at 75–76. There is no definition of church in 
the Code or Treasury regulations. Murphy, supra note 17, at 76. The IRS cannot police church 
political activity because there is a multitude of churches and no church is required to register with the 
IRS. Murphy, supra note 17, at 76. Surprisingly, this bill did not have the support of all church groups. 
For example, Texas Baptists Committed expressed concern not only about the separation of church 
and state but also concern that the bill would run contrary to the spirit of BCRA’s reduction of soft 
money influence on elections. See Jones Bill Comingles Church and State, TEX. BAPTISTS 
COMMITTED NEWSLETTER (Texas Baptists Committed, San Angelo, Tex.), Apr. 2003, http://www. 
txbc.org/2003Journals/April2003/Apr03JonesBill.htm. See also Mark Coppenger, First Person: HR 
235: Ending An Absurdity, BAPTIST PRESS, July 29, 2003, http://www.bpnews.net/bpnews.asp?id 
=16391 (“What the church, in turn, should not stand is the government conceit that it can penalize such 
[political] speech while proclaiming itself defender of the biblical sermon.”) 
 107. H.R. 235, 109th Cong. § 1 (2005). There are several grassroots organizations actively 
working to ensure that the bill passes in this session. WallBuilders is an organization dedicated to 
restoring America to the “constitutional, moral, and religious foundation upon which [it] was built.” 
WallBuilders.com, WallBuilders-About Us, http://www.wallbuilders.com/aboutus/index.htm (last 
visited Apr. 7, 2006). The WallBuilder’s website provides instructions on contacting Congressmen and 
tracking the bill’s status. WallBuilders.com, WallBuilders’ Resources: Houses of Worship Free 
Speech Restoration Act, http://www.wallbuilders.com/resources/search/detail.php?ResourceID=66 
(last visited Apr. 7, 2006); see also HR235.org, Returning Freedom of Speech to America’s Churches, 
http://www.hr235.org (last visited Apr. 9, 2006). As of this writing it has been referred to the House 
Ways and Means Committee. See Bill Summary and Status for 108th Congress, at http://thomas. 
loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/2?d109:h.r.00235: (last visited Apr. 7, 2006). 
 108. Pub. L. No. 108-357 (2004). 
 109. Editorial, Congress Toys with Forgiveness, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 14, 2004, at A18. Like the 
Houses of Worship Free Speech Restoration Act, the safe harbor provision would apply only to 
churches and not to other exempt organizations. Id. 
 110. Alan Cooperman, House Panel Drops ‘Safe Harbor for Churches’ Measure, WASH. POST, 
June 16, 2004, at A25. In addition to the safe harbor provision, the amendment also would have 
expressly allowed clergy members to participate in political campaigns as private citizens as long as 
they were not acting as an official functionary of the church. Id. This amendment, had it become law, 
still does not clarify whether Archbishop Burke’s Pastoral Letter, which he wrote as a church official 
and not as a private citizen, would be protected. See supra notes 84–87 and accompanying text. 
Equally unclear is whether a priest’s decision to refuse communion to a political candidate can fairly 
be said to be the actions made in a personal capacity. See Tax Guide for Churches, supra note 16, at 9. 
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III. ANALYSIS 
Although subject to limitations churches cannot be prohibited from 
engaging in political activity per se.111 However, the reality is that very 
few, if any, churches would choose to forgo the benefits of tax exemption 
in order to gain freedom from the prohibition on political activity.112 At 
present, there seems to be no real need for any church to do this; with few 
exceptions, churches can blatantly ignore the prohibition with little or no 
legal consequence.113 
A. The IRS Unevenly Applies its Enforcement Power 
One problem is that the IRS does not currently police potential 
violations by churches.114 Potential violations only come to light when 
watchdog groups such as Catholics for a Free Choice and Americans 
United for Separation of Church and State report them.115 Though such a 
 111. See Christian Echoes Nat’l Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849, 857 (10th Cir. 
1972). See also Cook, supra note 24, at 458; McConnell, Free Exercise of Religion, supra note 6, at 53 
(No matter which approach one takes to the Free Exercise Clause, “it is unconstitutional for the 
government to inflict penalties on religious practices as such.”).  
 112. See McDowell, supra note 30, at 77 (arguing tax-exempt status is “essential” in order for 
churches to “accomplish their religious and ethical obligations.”); see also Garnett, supra note 69, at 
798 (suggesting that prohibiting political activity as a condition of tax exemption “domesticates the 
churches’ evangelical vocation” and changes the idea of what religious believers’ faith requires). 
 113. See supra notes 79–80 and accompanying text. See also supra notes 84–87 and 
accompanying text. Short of a full page ad in a major newspaper, as was the case in Branch Ministries, 
there seems to be little real penalty for violating the § 501(c)(3) rules unless a third party makes a 
strong enough complaint to the IRS with enough proof to warrant a serious investigation. 
 114. See Murphy, supra note 17.  
 115. Catholics for a Free Choice, http://www.catholicsforchoice.org (last viewed May 15, 2006). 
Catholics for a Free Choice was established in 1973, the year Roe v. Wade legalized a woman’s right 
to obtain an abortion. Id.; see generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). It advocates for a woman’s 
right to choose and has filed complaints with the IRS asking for investigations into the political 
activities of several tax-exempt religious organizations. About Catholics for a Free Choice, 
http://www.catholicsforchoice.org/about/default.asp; Press Releases 2006, http://www.catholicsfor 
choice.org/news/pr/default.asp; see also supra notes 86–89 and accompanying text, Americans United 
Home page, http://www.au.org/site/PageServer (last visited Apr. 8, 2006). Like Catholics for a Free 
Choice, Americans United is very vocal about keeping church and state absolutely separate, including 
upholding the political activity prohibition for tax-exempt organizations. Recently, it reported that 
evangelist Dr. James Dobson’s Focus on the Family organization allegedly violated its tax-exempt 
status by publishing an allegedly biased comparison of George W. Bush and John Kerry during the 
2004 election. Posting of Rob Boston, Focus on Politics: IRS Asked to Review Dobson Electioneering, 
http://blog.au.org/2005/02/focus_on_politi.html (Feb. 3, 2005, 13:56 EST). The article complained of, 
published in Focus on the Family’s flagship magazine, Citizen, compared the candidates’ positions on 
only three topics: stem-cell research, abortion, and same-sex marriage. Id. Karla Dial, What’s At Stake, 
CITIZEN, Nov. 2004, http://www.family.org/cforum/citizenmag/coverstory/a0034350.cfm. Focus on 
the Family contends that the article was published under the auspices of the organization’s political 
arm that was established under § 501(c)(4). Id. section 501(c)(4) organizations are allowed to 
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system begs the question of whether enforcement is fair,116 it should be 
noted that, at least for the 2004 election, a special audit of the IRS’ 
handling of complaints revealed no evidence of improper bias or political 
motive in § 501(C)(3) enforcement.117 However these auditing 
organizations may have agendas of their own that could skew results 
toward a particular political bias.118 Even the appearance of such bias 
could leave the IRS vulnerable to charges of selective prosecution.119 
participate in political activity. I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) (2000). Americans United counters that Citizen is, 
and has always been, published by the § 501(c)(3) organization. See Boston, supra. “[T]he very issue 
that contained the Bush-Kerry comparison article also listed this statement: ‘Published monthly by 
Focus on the Family, a nonprofit organization recognized for tax-deductible giving by the federal 
government.’” Id. In fall 2004, Americans United filed an IRS complaint asking for an investigation 
into pro-Kerry rallies sponsored by Ohio and Pennsylvania churches. See Press Release, Americans 
United for Separation of Church and State, Churches Continue to Violate Federal Tax Law with 
Partisan Events, Says Americans United (Oct. 26, 2004), http://www.au.org/site/News2?abbr= 
pr&page=NewsArticle&id=7021&security=1002&news_iv_ctrl=1241 (last visited Feb. 6, 2005).  
 116. The IRS does investigate potential criminal violations of the Code through its Criminal 
Investigation Unit. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, DEP’T OF TREASURY, Criminal Investigation 
(CI) At-a Glance, available at http://www.irs.gov/irs/article/0,,id=98398,00.html (last visited Apr. 8, 
2006). The IRS published a Fact Sheet detailing the procedures it follows after receiving complaints 
about tax-exempt organizations from third parties. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, DEP’T OF 
TREASURY, Fact Sheet 2002-10, IRS TREATMENT OF THIRD-PARTY INFORMATION RELATING TO TAX 
EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS, Mar. 29, 2002, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-news/fs-02-10.pdf. 
However, the IRS currently cannot disclose whether it has initiated an examination of the exempt 
organization or the result of that examination. I.R.C. § 6103 (2000).  
 117. Department of the Treasury, Reference No. 2005-10-035, Review of the Exempt 
Organizations Function Process for Reviewing Alleged Political Campaign Intervention by Tax 
Exempt Organizations (Feb. 17, 2005), http://www.treas.gov/tigta/auditreports/2005reports/ 
200510035fr.pdf. This audit report reviewed the IRS’ Exempt Organizations process for reviewing 
allegations of prohibited involvement in political campaign activity in its entirety. Id. at 2. In 2004, the 
IRS implemented a fast track process designed to evaluate complaints within seven to ten days, as 
opposed to the customary sixty days. Id. The fast track process also attempted to address recurring 
violations by the same organizations. Id. at 2. Despite this fast track process, the first contact letter sent 
to any organization only was mailed six weeks before the 2004 presidential election. Id. at 3. The audit 
report found this delay generated concern that the IRS was acting under improper political influence 
itself. Id. However, the audit also found that the fast track efforts were hampered by a “lack of clear 
guidance” as well as “inadequate resources.” Id. at 9. 
 118. Some supporters of the Houses of Worship Free Speech Restoration Act believe that this is 
already the case. Mark Coppenger, a Chicago area Baptist minister, claims that the bill will free the 
conservative pulpit from the prohibition on political activity, whereas “the liberal pulpit has enjoyed a 
de facto exemption from the beginning.” Coppenger, supra note 106.  
 119. For example, the Church at Pierce Creek argued that the IRS engaged in selective 
prosecution in violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. Branch Ministries v. 
Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137, 144 (D.C. Cir. 2000). To succeed on a claim of selective prosecution, the 
church had to “‘prove that (1) [it] was singled out for prosecution from among others similarly situated 
and (2) that [the] prosecution was improperly motivated, i.e., based on race, religion or another 
arbitrary classification.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Washington, 705 F.2d 489, 494 (D.C. Cir. 
1983)) (modification in original). The court rejected the church’s claim in part because, although it 
submitted proof of other churches and pastors specifically endorsing candidates who suffered no 
adverse consequences, it did not offer proof that another church placed “advertisements in newspapers 
with nationwide circulations opposing a candidate and soliciting tax deductible contributions to defray 
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By contrast, the FEC actively enforces federal campaign finance laws 
and regulations.120 It has a third-party complaint process similar to 
Treasury procedures, but it also actively monitors organizations and takes 
referrals from other government agencies regarding potential violations.121 
The FEC, unlike the IRS, has a clear objective of limiting the effect of 
money in elections based on the principle of fairness.122 
B. Issue Advocacy Is as Meaningless a Standard Under the Tax Code as It 
Is Under Federal Election Law 
Archbishop Burke’s Pastoral Letter123 and other recent actions by 
churches and religious organizations124 are good examples of the inherent 
difficulty in separating issue advocacy from candidate advocacy.125 The 
Pastoral Letter, for instance, does not specifically refer to any candidate or 
political party.126 However, when coupled with his public refusal, as a 
representative of the Archdiocese and the greater Catholic Church, to 
serve communion to John Kerry during a political campaign because of 
Kerry’s support for abortion rights,127 the public message is clear. 
Statements of this nature blur the “traditional distinction between political 
campaign activity and voter education activity . . . that the latter is 
nonpartisan.”128 
Regardless of one’s opinion on the need for such a distinction, any 
regulation or prohibition of speech gives rise to First Amendment 
concerns. The application of the prohibition on political activity to 
their cost.” Id. at 144. However, if enough of these disparate cases arise and if most involve supporters 
of one particular political party, a selective prosecution claim could have more weight. One aspect of 
these cases to consider is that the majority of them seem to involve political activity by conservative 
religious factions, which almost always support the Republican Party. See supra notes 35–55, 89 and 
accompanying text. 
 120. See FEC.gov, FEC Enforcement Matters, http://www.fec.gov/em/em.shtml (last visited Apr. 
9, 2006).  
 121. Id. Like the IRS, the FEC takes referrals from other government agencies. See FEC.org, 
Filing a Complaint Brochure, http://www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/complain.shtml (last visited Apr. 9, 
2006). Unlike the IRS, a complaint to the FEC about possible campaign finance violations must be 
signed and sworn. Id. In addition to Matters Under Review (“MUR”), a confidential review process, 
the FEC also has an alternative dispute resolution program to settle alleged campaign finance law 
violations. See id.  
 122. See Houck, supra note 30, at 72. 
 123. See supra notes 84–89 and accompanying text. 
 124. See supra note 80 and accompanying text; see also supra note 89. 
 125. See supra notes 90–95 and accompanying text. 
 126. See supra notes 84–87 and accompanying text. 
 127. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
 128. HOPKINS, supra note 17, at 509 (emphasis in original). 
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religious organizations is no different.129 Churches, especially evangelical 
denominations,130 often feel it is part of their theological mission to 
influence societal values and public policy.131 The prohibition on political 
activity has been criticized as highly intrusive on churches’ constitutional 
rights: 
‘[T]he IRS interpretations [of the political campaign prohibition] 
make compliance extremely difficult and are highly intrusive on 
‘free exercise’ and other constitutional rights. In particular, 
churches must act at their peril as they attempt to walk the obscure 
line between loss of exemption and faithfulness to the obligation to 
speak out on the moral dimension of important social issues.’132 
If properly and consistently enforced, it is difficult to see how an 
absolute prohibition on political campaign activity is an “obscure line.” 
The above critique also fails to acknowledge that there is no per se 
restriction on political speech or political activity as long as churches are 
willing to forgo tax-exemption.133 Forgoing these clear financial 
advantages, while not easy, is a fair option. In addition, whether, precisely 
because of First Amendment issues, the government can permanently deny 
tax-exempt status to churches at all is unclear.134 Moreover, churches are 
not singled out for the political activity prohibition; but are merely one of 
many types of tax-exempt organizations subject to the same restriction.135 
Each piece of recently proposed legislation to modify or abolish the 
prohibition on political activity has been problematic.136 The 2001 Houses 
of Worship Political Speech Protection Act, as drafted,137 would 
potentially be unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause; a 
 129. See supra notes 60–73 and accompanying text.  
 130. See generally Coppenger, supra note 106. 
 131. HOPKINS, supra note 17, at 507. 
 132. Id. at 507–08 (citing Wilfred R. Caron & Deirdre Dessingue, I.R.C. § 501(c)(3): Practical 
and Constitutional Implications of ‘Political’ Activity Restrictions, 2 J.L. & POL. 169, 178 (1985)). 
 133. See supra note 59. 
 134. See Johnson, supra note 34, at 893.  
 135. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000). See also Johnson, supra note 34, at 893–94 and accompanying 
text. Moreover, a church also has the option of forming a sister 501(c)(4) organization, which is not 
bound by either the substantial lobbying restriction or political campaign activity prohibition. See 
Cook, supra note 24, at 472–74. Having two organizations would require two completely separate 
financial schemes. Id. at 473. Money could not flow from one to the other, because contributions to the 
§ 501(c)(3) would still be tax deductible while contributions to the 501(c)(4) social welfare 
organization would not be deductible. Id. at 474. The author suggests that in this way churches could 
engage in “a variety of political activities consistent . . . with [the churches’] religious mission.” Id. at 
477 (referencing a church’s Sunday bulletin). 
 136. See infra notes 137–144. 
 137. H.R. 2357, 107th Cong. (2001). 
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reasonable interpretation of a repeal of the prohibition on political activity 
for churches but not other § 501(c)(3) organizations is state-sponsored 
encouragement of religion.138 The currently pending Houses of Worship 
Free Speech Restoration Act139 is also troubling. If it becomes law, 
churches will obtain preferential tax treatment with less restriction than 
similarly situated organizations.140 Because the bill includes “other 
presentation[s]” made during a religious service, the pulpit would be open 
to partisan stump speeches by political candidates.141 Finally, the so-called 
“safe harbor” amendment to the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 
would have only given “safe harbor” to those churches and religious 
organization so inclined to break the law.142 The rate of actual revocation 
of tax-exempt status for § 501(c)(3) churches and religious organizations 
is already minimal.143 Proving an organization intentionally violated the 
prohibition, especially if the act in question could be framed as addressing 
an issue rather than a specific candidate, would be very difficult.144 A 
more likely scenario is that politically inclined churches and religious 
organizations would store up their three chances and “spend” them as 
needed. In practice, the prohibition on political activity would be reduced 
to a voluntary guideline. 
IV. PROPOSAL 
In order for the prohibition on political activity to be truly effective, the 
government should more actively enforce it. Because the prohibition 
concerns political campaign activity and can therefore potentially involve 
improper influence on political campaigns, the FEC should play a 
cooperative role in investigating allegations of prohibited political activity. 
The FEC already has procedures in place for dealing with campaign 
finance regulations.145 These procedures include active policing of the 
 138. See Murphy, supra note 17, at 78–81. 
 139. H.R. 235, 109th Cong. (2005).  
 140. See Murphy, supra note 17, at 74. 
 141. H.R. 235, 109th Cong. (2005). While political campaign speeches during worship services 
would be the antithesis of a wall of separation between church and state, this may not be the slippery 
slope that it appears to be. Americans have shown a preference for leaving partisan politics at the 
church door. See supra note 4.  
 142. See Cooperman, supra note 110, at A25. Pub. L. No. 108-357 (2004).  
 143. As of 1998, thirty cases were reported as pending at the IRS “involv[ing] violations or 
alleged violations of the prohibition on political campaign activity.” Halloran & Kearney, supra note 
15, at 120. However, the only reported case of revocation in the intervening years is Branch 
Ministries. supra notes 49–59 and accompanying text.  
 144. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
 145. See supra notes 120–121 and accompanying text.  
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campaign finance laws in addition to receiving third-party complaints.146 
Currently, the IRS depends on third-party referrals before it begins an 
investigation of religious organizations or churches if a third party files a 
complaint.147 The FEC could use its pre-existing investigative powers148 to 
act as a powerful, consistent, third-party referral system for the IRS. The 
policy goal of campaign finance regulations is to prevent corruption of the 
political system by improper financial means.149 The policy goal of the 
prohibition on political activity for churches and religious organizations is 
to prevent improper use of tax-free money.150 Both are concerned with not 
only corruption but the appearance of corruption.151 Tax experts have 
suggested that where Treasury and FEC regulations share a similar 
purpose, equal standards should be used.152  
Alternatively, the IRS should adopt a policy of active enforcement on 
its own. The examples cited in this Note of questionable campaign activity 
by religious leaders acting in an official capacity,153 churches,154 and other 
religious organizations155 are by no means exhaustive. The IRS, by its own 
estimate, investigated over one hundred claims during the 2004 election 
cycle from referrals alone.156 While are there are legitimate funding issues 
involved in moving to a proactive, rather than referral, regime, it is a plan 
worth exploring. Because the flow of allegations tend to match the 
election cycle, current Treasury employees could temporarily shift their 
responsibilities to a special task force once every four years. The IRS may 
also be able to hire investigators on a temporary basis, thereby minimizing 
 146. Id. 
 147. See supra note 116 and accompanying text. 
 148. See supra notes 120–121 and accompanying text. 
 149. See supra notes 97–98 and accompanying text. 
 150. See Murphy, supra note 17, at 62–64. Under the subsidy theory of tax exemption, churches 
and religious organizations receive this exemption in exchange only for providing services the 
government would otherwise need to furnish. Id. at 64. As Professor Murphy points out, there is “no 
evidence of a shortage of groups that campaign on behalf of candidates for public office.” Id. The 
passage of BCRA is further proof that rather than a shortage, the opposite situation is in fact the case. 
Id. at 64–65.
 151. See supra note 99. 
 152. See Commentary on Politicking, supra note 15, at 855, 859, 862. Tax lawyers have urged the 
IRS to adopt definitions used by the FEC to “reduce the number of situations in which the same 
conduct is considered political for tax purposes and not political for election law purposes.” Id. at 859.  
 153. Burke Letter, supra notes 84–87 and accompanying text; see also Goldberg, supra note 55, at 
A4. 
 154. See supra notes 50–54 and accompanying text; Kirkpatrick, supra note 79; McFadden, supra 
note 80.  
 155. See supra notes 36–39 and accompanying text. 
 156. See Brewington, supra note 20, at A1. 
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the budget cost of extra workers. If the IRS utilized their power to impose 
excise taxes on offenders, it could pay for some of the enforcement costs. 
Second, the IRS definition of political activity should be revised to 
address the problem of improper political activity cloaked in the guise of 
allowable “voter education.”157 As evidenced by events of the 2004 
election,158 this distinction lacks teeth. It is not substantially different from 
the issue advocacy versus express advocacy problem addressed by 
Congress in the BCRA.159 Voter education activity via churches ideally 
should be limited to voter registration drives and education on the right to 
vote.160 While the government cannot regulate speech by individuals 
acting in a private capacity,161 it can substantially limit actions taken by 
religious organizations, churches, and those individuals acting in an 
official capacity on these organizations’ behalf.162 Voter education 
activities by churches and religious organizations can be limited to the 
mechanics of voting and truly nonpartisan encouragement of voter 
turnout.163 The message should be to encourage participation, not 
partisanship. Voter guides should be discouraged unless they are regularly 
published and clearly unbiased.164 Churches wishing to obtain the benefits 
of § 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status should refrain from using the official 
church platform to state their views on candidates, whether overt or 
cloaked in disapproval of certain key issues.165  
V. CONCLUSION 
There is a constant tension between religion and politics, in part 
because of the inherently competing public policies of church-state and 
freedom of religious expression.166 However, churches and other religious 
organizations should not have the benefit of using tax-free dollars to 
influence the political process.167 They should also not be able to skirt the 
prohibition on political activity because of a loose interpretation of “issue 
 157. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
 158. See Burke Letter, supra notes 84–87 and accompanying text; supra note 79 and 
accompanying text; supra notes 81–89 and accompanying text. 
 159. See supra notes 90–92 and accompanying text. 
 160. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
 161. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 162. See supra notes 22–26 and accompanying text. 
 163. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
 164. See supra note 17. 
 165. See Burke Letter, supra notes 84–87 and accompanying text; see also Dessingue, supra note 
17, at 914–15.  
 166. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
 167. See supra notes 73, 148 and accompanying text. 
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education” and inconsistent enforcement of the prohibition itself.168 Even 
setting aside the church-state separation concerns, organizations 
subsidized by the government should not be able to use those dollars to 
advance a partisan agenda.169 The FEC is the logical body to assist the IRS 
in this case, working to ensure the proper use of tax-free dollars.170 
Kelly S. Shoop* 
 168. See supra notes 116–117 and accompanying text. 
 169. See supra note 73, 148 and accompanying text. 
 170. See supra notes 148–150 and accompanying text. There are legitimate concerns associated 
with the involvement of any other government agency in enforcement of the Code. However, these 
concerns can be minimized because the FEC would merely be an investigative arm for possible 
political acts, not improper accounting or other technical violations. Any actual enforcement would be 
the purview of the IRS only. 
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